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FORMS AND EXPLANATION IN THE PHAEDO
Charlotte Stough
University of California, Santa Barbara
December 1973
In a well-known passage at Phaedo lOOc Socrates declares that "if anything else
is beautiful besides Beauty it s e lf , it is beautiful for no otheri reason than because
With that s t at ement he advances the hypothesis of
it p art akes of that Beauty".
Forms in an effort to prove that the soul is immortal but also, apparently inci·
dentally to that central theme , to expound his own view of "causation" (-rftv ahta'll
�1f\c5et(etv).1 The section of the dialogue in which the Platonic Socrates is made
to recount his ea rly inquiries into nattn'al philosophy, and wh i ch provides the cont•xt·
of the quotation, contains Plato's most explicit s tatement of the explana�o:ey role
of the Forms • . It. is just that function of Plato's Forms, as set forth at Phaedo
95e-l06e, which. I propose to examine in this paper..
More specifically my question
will be:
What is.the force of the claim that the eidos is aitia? The method I
follow in trying'to answer that question is dictated by the important consideration
that th e hypothesis of Forms is presented in that context as· a solution to cet>tain
vexing problems.
My inquiry therefore falls into two main sections in wh,ich I
pose the following questions:
What is the nature of the problems set forth.in
relevant passages of the Pbaedo, and how does Plato's doctl'i.ne solve, or attempt
to solve, them? A third and a final section deal with some implications of the_.
thesis developed in the earlier pa rts �f the paper.
·

l..

The, Proble!Jl of Opposi tes

"

·!

'

Socrates' ostensible raeason for.hypothesizing F orms at Phaedo lOOb-c is to
answer an objection raised by Cebes (87a-88c), which seemed to cast doubt on the

immortality of the soul.
But Plato's aims �re seldom one-dimensional.
It is·
soon intimated (97b4-7), and finally assert�d (100b7-9), that the Forms are also
intended to provide a solution to another' difficulty, a problem concerning t.he

"causes of each thing, the reason why each thing comes into being, perishes, and

is" (96a9-lO:
e\6'tvat 't'�S a\d<xs h:&a't'ov, .Sta -rt ytyvnat lKaato'V Kat 6ta i't
&ndAAUta\ Ka\ 61a Ti �CJTt). P�ilosopbically the more interesting, this aporia
lies just beneath the surface of the dramatic discussion of the soul's fate after
death.
My initial task will be to try to determine the nature of Socrates' .
puzzlement ovex- "causation" in an effort to isolate an important sense in lthich the

Forms, in Plato's mind, might be said to provide an �xplanation of something.
A useful bit of information is woven into' Socrates' account of his early
experience in search of the caus es of things.
His troub les began with attempts
to explain, as.he tel ls us, the " coming to be", "perishing", and "being" of thin�s
(95e9, 96a9-10, 91b5-6, 97c6-7). As a youth he was curious about the conditions
under which living creatut'es are bred (ouvTpt•eo0at); he wondered whether memory and
···opinion arise ( y1 yv£a0a t) out of the senses of hearing, s ight , and smell, or
something else; whetheI' knowledge comes into being (y�yveaeal) from memory and
opinion.
And he was equally concerned about the de structi on ('eop�) of these
phenomena• But Socrates soon reached the conclus i on that he was unsuited for
these· studies, which so bewildered him as to cause dissatisfaction with all•
explanations, even those he had thought reasonable prior to his inquiries. ·Indeed.
he implies (96c3-7) that the study of natut'e actually compelled him to abandon
There follows .(96c6-97b3) an account of the exp
his pre-philosophical v! ews.
lanations that Socrates was naively (and� as he no� thinks, mistakenly) p:;-one to
a ccept prior to his philosophical investigations. I want to take up these puzzles
very shortly.
But. what ·is interesting about the b�ief. introduction to them
(96a6-e6) is that it te ll s us that Socrates' philosoph ica l puzzlement should not
. be confused by us with the n_aive curiosity about natural causes that prompted
his reseaztches ( 96a6-8). 2 Socrates' philosophical difficulties are actually
generated by that inquiry, and they con ce rn the coming to be, perishing, and being
We should therefore expect these notions to be especially relevant to an
of things.
·

·

I·':

.·

·,
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understanding of the puzzles that follow in the text.
The point of the intro
ductory passage (96a6.-b6) might be put this way.
Socrates' investigation of the
"causes" of thi ngs has unearth ed certain philosophical problems connected with
generation, destruction, and being--problems that his own favorite com mon-sense

·

explanations .. (96c3-7), as we,11 as the m ore learned theories of the physicists
(96b3), had either not taken i nto account or been able.to solve.
Is there any
· diagnosis ·of these puzzles; consistent with the text, which will make each of
th em intelligible as plHlosophical problems and. thereby help .
s
u to understand the
source of Socrates' difficulties?:t I believe that such an account can be given,
if we are c areful to obs.erve Plato's own language as a reminder that, as ·he appar ..

ently understands.these problems , they are supposed to throw serious doubt on the
beipg, becoming, .or perishing. Plato 1 s own way of
viewing them gives unit to what otherwise must seem a very heterogeneous mixture
�
of issues and problems.
For convenience .I shall arrange the puzzles into three
groupings, the firs t arid third specifically dealing with coming to be (and
'perishing) and the second with being.
'
' '
'
,
l.
Socrates first m entions the problem of expla:ining .growth. (96c7-d6). , He
used to. think. "f:hat the reason why a man grows ( o 1q -r"i. ti:vepw'ITos et"��ve:'t'ct \ ). is
Flesh is added
that he takes in food and drink thus adding to the bulk of his body.
to flesh and bone. t0 bone, "and in this way the small.man becomes large" (r<:ai
off-rw ytyv€aecn Tov crµir<:pov '&vepw'ITov µ"eyav}
But the explanation had to be discarded,
·and (from the clause just quoted) we .inight expect this to have something to do with
the fact that "becoming" (y� yve:aecn ) is the thing to be explaind
e
, m ore specifically
something's coming to be its "opposite". 5
The concept o f oppos ites (�vav1"1a), which.is central t o this puzzle and the
rest, promises a clue to their s oJ,ution.
On the as sumption that opposites are

intelligibility of so!Tlething' s

·

·

• .

.

. ·

designated by "incompatible" predicates,6 it is reason�le to suppose' that philo
sophical difficulties that crop up over them will involve logical inconsistency .
in assertions assigning properties to something.
Granted that thi
s is so,. the
'possibility of a philosophical snarlseems less remote.· For if, i n settingforth

the problem, we consciously' fail to obs erve the dis tinction between a character and
the subject it. characterizes,, contradictions will turn up. in Socrates' apparently
inexplicable proposition that "the s mall man becomes large".
Suppose that the subject expression ("the small man") refers not to one or

another substantial individual of a certain s ort, characterized by being . s)'llall,
hut to a unita:ry s ubject compris ed in this case.of two "things" of equal status,
namely, man and.small(ness) blended into one, and so no less suitably designated
by "the small" (6 crµir<:p d°s ) than by "the man" (� &vepw'!Tos).
To clarify this
supposition and its implications, let me try to bring into focus the pk.ture. that lies
behind it.
We can imagine a concrete individual as a complex blend of all those
ingredients, each enjoying the same rank as a "thing",-de
signated by.its multiple
substantial and adjectival predicates . 7
To do that it is necessary to erase. the

familiar distinction between subs tance and attribute and to view both alike as
If that distinction is obliterated,
possible "thing"-components of a complex object.
the differing functions of s ubs tance and quality te
s, as we1i as the distinction
rm
Both.man and
in its wake
follow
will
between predicative and identity s tatements,
smal l(ness ), to return to Socrates' example, will be "thing"-components of.the same
.. blended object itself fully "des cribed" by enumeration of the names of each m ember
· of the complex.
And if that is so, the name of any component, not just a substance
term, can (in principle) function as a referring expression to de�ignate (however
incompletely) the blended object.
Finally, any descriptive statement that.links
. a character predicate to a linguistic s ukiject conceived as designating such a
•

.

complex will be a statement identifying.that character with a component of the
blended object.
Hence the u s u al predicative s tatement will be what I shal1 term
a "partial" identity s tatement.
i
(predicative
Just as the propos ition that Simmias s
ly). small is. entailed by the predication that Sirnmias is a small man�. so (according
.to ou r present picture) th e partial identity statementthat the complex object

..
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referred to by "Sirnmias" is small will be entailed by the full identity that defines
That Simmias is small
the being of Simmias by the conj unct ion of all his components.
will follow from the fact that small(ness) is one of Simmias• components-�will follow
in virt ue of the being of Simmias, in virtue of what Simmias is.
Now inasmuch
as the components of the complex are jointly constitutive of that thing, anything
incompatible with one of those components will be incompatible with the object
itself.
If we take "the small man" of Socrates' examp le to refer to such a

blended object, that object cannot be said to be large without contradicting the
proposition definitive of it's be ing .
To make such an ass ertion would be to say

that the blended object is partially identical with something incompatible with one
of its comp on ent s an d: 'thus inGompatible with its own being.
Similarly "the s mall

.man becomes large" will' also be internally inconsistent by the implication tha t at
some time a component of the complex object will be identica l with its opposite.
It says, in effect, that at some f'L'!.ture t ime (t) "the. small man i� large" is true.
The troubles only intensify with fi;lrther elaboration of the picture.
Both sub
stantive and qualifying terms name components of the blended object and so enjoy
equal authority in. their partial stat�ments of what · it is.
Both can f unct ion

referentially to pick out that complex ob j ect .
The result, for the example in the
text, is that "man" .C�v6pw1Tos) no more appropri ately refers to the subject of dis

(oµl.KiJ6s). A legitimate,.if more compressed, alternative
formulation of the original proposition will t herefo r e be "the small becomes large"
"
( � aµ 'l Kpos y l.yVe:'tet 1. µ'E: y ets ) , 8 'the subject term referring as usual to the complex

course than "small"

·

by naming one of its constituents.
But in the case of "small" this dual r ole may
cause serious trouble.
As the name of a "thing"-component it isequivalent to
"smallness" (crµlKP�Tns), while in its role as logi cal subject it functions no

differently from, in this instance, "man". . Because the linguistic subject can refer
to the com plex only by' naming an .. ingredient of that object, the proposition seems

to assert explicitly. that the component named by the subject· term becomes its

opposite.· Our pi c t ure thus forces the formal contradiction that'"the F(F-ness)
becomes not-F(F'.'"ness)", whe
. re F is a tjla,r.acter var iable . 9

I have"intentionally p�esent�d this schem� as·a c ons truct ion designed to explore
.
the ramifications, in the context of the Phaedo, of treat i ng attributes as if they
Nevertheless, it would.be possible for.someone to reach the same
were things.
c on clus ion s quite without contrivance, that is, if for s ome reason or other he
"simply failed to draw the dis tinc ti9n bE;itween sub s t ance and attribute.necessary
My thesis.willbe that such a person is 'the Platonic
to avoid the confu s i o n.
So crate s who, during his youthful inquir ies into the causes of things, uncovered
the philosophical prob lem of "becoming", which bis own end other more elaborate
No account of the consumption of
physical explanations were unabie to solve.
food and drink by the body;, or any other hypothesis of the natural philosophers,
will ever suc ceed in explaining why. ( iS i & Tl. ) what is small becomes l arge , if that
What is needed--and this
claim is understood to be logically self-contradictory.
is the first fruit of Socrates' philosophical inquiry--is an explanat i on that
will make possi ble (logically) the "coming to be11 of o ppos ites , so that what is

small may inte llig i b ly be said to become large, the reby rendering comprehensible
.
'
10
.
. the natural phenomenon of growth.
The c o nf us ion which I have maintained is crucial to this puzzle comes out
cle�rly in the text at l03a4-c2, wh ere Socrates expli citly draws a distinction
•
.. •
.. ,
....
d
1TEpl. 1wv EXOVTWV Tet e:vavna
at b3 an
1Tpa.yµa
e:vetv:r1ov
b etween an opposite thing ( -ro
'
'
,
,.,
at b6) and the opposite ch arac t e r itself (afJ'to TO lvav-rtov at b4 and irE:pt �Ke:ivwv
aOtwv Jv lx6vTwv �XEt Tnv frnwwµtav -rtt &voµca;;crµe:va at b8). The dis tinc tion
clears·up p recisely that muddle into which S oc r ates ' early:speculations had drawn
him and.which in this subsequent passage is very cleverly put in the mouth of one of
•

•

.

·rt is interesting that the passage at 103a4ff. explicitly refers
his interlocutors
There t,he dist inc 
b ack to 70d7ff., where the discussion c o n cerne d opposite things.
tion between character and thing chqracterized was quite correctly observed by
. crates ( be i ng p�ior to his t:ale of philosophical perplexity) � but Socrates I
so
•

.

..
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clarity in that passage was apparently not matched by his listeners, as Plato now
indicates (at 103a4ff.), thus making with dramatic skill and subtlet-Y an impor
tant philosophical point.
By calling attention to the possibilities of confusion
latent in the notion of the "coming to be of opposites", Plato brings out the
source of Socrates' own youthful difficulties in explaining the phenomenon of
growth.

2.
Socrates next takes up some puzzles (98d8-e3, lO ia-b, 102c-d) having to do
with comparitive differences of magnitude and quanti.t y.
He used to be satisfied
to explain s uch differences by reference to the degree to which one object exceeds
(or falls short of)another.

head.11

One man is greater than another by (reason of) a

Ten is �ore than eight because of the additional two.

An object two cubits

long is greater than an object one cubit long, becaus e of the excess amount of half

its own length.

(tvavT(OS

But, as he remarks a little further on (lOla-b), an inconsistency

,A.6yos) arises here.

The larger will be larger for the same r eason that the

smaller is smaller, and the larger will be larger because of something (a head)
which iii small.
This' we are told' is a "monstrous" consequence (Ka\ TOUTO on

T�pas e:ivai ) .
The same kind of difficulty iS involved .in claiming. that ten is more
than eight by (reason of) two or the object two cubits long is greater than the
cubit-long object by (reason of)half its own length.
Considerations of this sort
·

led Socrates to despair of finding a satisfactory explanation of these things.
A pair of curious, and important, assumptions are at work in this passage.
If we. generalize the examples,. Socrates seems to be objecting that opposite occur-

.rences or facts cannot be accounted for by the s·ame explanation and also, apparently,
that the aitia cannot be (or be characterized by)the opposite of that which it
purports to explain.

The reason for these assumptions.is by no means obvious, but

if we grant the conditions necessary to make them plausible, we shall·perh'aps be

nearer to an understanding of what Socrates means by aitia.

Notice that violation

.of· one or.other of these principles is evidently enough to constitute a reductio
ad.absurdu m of the sort of explanation he was previously disposed to accept.
This
suggests that ''by (reason

of)"

something like deductive force.

and "because of". are understood by Socrates to carry
If the relationship between the explanatory

proposition and the explanandum is one of entailment, such that the second can

be deduced from the first
the inconsistencies mentioned in the examples under
i
2
I shall return to this point later, but I want to
t urn now to another less obvious instance of problems connected with relative
review are quite genuine.

·

magnitudes.

:

·

·

At 102b•d Socrates remarks that Simmias is larger than Socrates but smaller

,•

than Phaedo, C!-nd there is a question as to the correct explanation of this fact.
It is suggested that a (mistaken) way one�might attempt to proceed would be to

invoke the being of Simmias

(-ro Eiµµfov dvm.)

to account,.. for it.

I include the

fact to be explained in this passage in the second group of puzzles, because with
the help of our model it is possible to recast it in the form of a familiar logical

problem involving relative magnitudes.

And once the problem is so understood,

there is good reason for rejecting the hypothesis, as Socrates does, that Simmias

. ,,

has the properties in question because he is Simmias or because Phaedo is Phaedo

•

Suppressing the distinction between Simmias and his attributes, we can think of

Simmias as a blend of all the "thing"-components named by predicate expressions
that are true·of him.· The prl':)position that Simmias is larger than Socrates but

smalle'r than Phaedo can then be expressed as two partial identities, each following
logically from the proposition defining what Simmias is.
But si.nce the conjunct
of those two propositions is internally inconsistent, the resulting-contradiction

wi.11 be a restatement of the fact to be explained.

The implication of this passage
may .well be that it w.ould .be fruitless to try to explain such an impossible state
of affairs .merely by re ference to the· being of Simmias.
And Socrates would again
have reason to complain that, if·we accept the mistaken explanation, "the larger will

be larger for the same reason tl1at the smaller is smaller".·

The failure to distin
guish between character and owner again ends in paradox, this time over the question
, .. ..
'

I
•

,. .:.
'.

•,

)I

•,

,'<

.
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of the ''being" of Simr.nias, a predicament: similar tb the on$ involving growth, in
which Socrates had previously· come up against the unint�lligibility of "becoming".

The text permits.a closer look at the anatomy of this puzzle.
At 102cl0 we
' are told that because Simmias is larger ( µ d r;wv) than Socrates but smaller (t>.&nwv)
_than Pha�do, he comes to he called both small (crµ1Kp6s) ani:I large: (µ£ycxs)�
The
.assumption is that the predicates_ "large11 and "larger than'' ('.'small" and "smaller

than") a re to receive the s:ame treatment in the exposi1;ion (and solution) of this
··problem (lOOeS-6).
Both deg?lees of.the adjective have the same reference, which
irt,the case'of Simmias will be largeness (and smallness) (l02b3-6).13
There is
clearly some slippage in the move from "Simmias is larger than Socrates·": or
"Simmias is large in relation to Socrates" to "Sim!Ilias is .large", but co!lt!lary to
what, :for that reason, may seem to be the most inviting hypothesis, the problem
worrying Socrates (the incoherency of the secon� puzzle) does not spring from the

unqualified ascription of relational predicates.to a single subject.
Socrates tells
us that if A is larger than B and smaller than C, A is indeed both large and srnallt
but not in relation to the same thing.
Relativ'e to the size of: B; A has largeness,
while he has smallness compared to c.14
No contradiction results from that, so
the correct diagnosis cannot be that these problems arise because A is (predicatively)

both large and small.
The source of the trouble is more likely to be that A is
thought of as being (partially) identical with the opposites large(ness) and
· ·

small(ness).

On that hypothesis it would seem to follow that "the large (largeness)

is the small (smallness)", a proposition which Socrat_es clearly understood to be
self-contradictory.
Indeed .he underscores this in the passage immediately
·

following (l02d6-8) by his insistence that "not only.will largeness itself never

admit to being simultaneously large and small, but also_, the largeness in us. will
neve� fCcept smallness or admit to being exceeded".
Again the crucial fallacy must
be :-trac;ed to insensitivity to any relevant distinction between an attribute and
that of which it is an attribute, such that to say of Simmias that he. is large is
not to predicate a property (relational or otherwise) of Simmias, but to assimilate
tq Sirru:rlias a thing-component apparently of the same logical type. i 5 ··'·(Notice fhat
we.need not suppose Socrates to.mean in this in8tc3,nce that largeness will.not
accept smallness, because largeness itself has the property of being large and
therefore cannot also be characterized as small without contradiction.16 . Thpugh
Plato may indeed have been preyto<such a confusion (and that is an independent
question), it is important to see that the puzzles in this passage' are governed:

by a fallacy logically more primitive than tnat of self-predication.)
3.
The third type of problem relates to arithmetical operations (96e5-97b4,
10lb10-d3).
Socrates professes inability to understand why or how one thing can
become two by the addition of one, or how, when each is single, they can become two

merely by being joined together.
Nor can he grasp how two can come into being
His next complaint
by the division of a single thing for the same sort of reason.
has a familiar ring.
To claim that the ge'neration of two can be explained first
by conjunction (bringing together) and then by disjunction (separating) is to offer
"opposite" reasons for the same occurrence, and this is apparently no less absurd
On the supposition
than adducing a single explanation for opposite occurrences.

that this last objection can be rendered intelligible in much the same manner as
its twin in the preceding puzzle, let us concentrate on the more central issue of
·

·

arithmetical operations.
That this part of the puzzle is not framed explicitly in the language of
The question is how a unity can become .a
opposites does little to disguise it.
plural:ity, and "one" and "two" are treated accordingly as incompatible predicates.
If it is claimed that one (thing) becomes two, there is no way to avoid parado x;
mathematical talk of addition and division will scarcely explain how the F (a
Again the slide between (formal) attl:'ibute
unity) c an become not-F (a plurality).
and subject, between a unitary entity and unity itself, is essential for this
Notice that it makes no difference whether the problem is
puzzle to have any bite.
stated in terms of the juxtaposition of physical objects or in more abstract

Stough 6
The question is the same in either case:

. ·mathematical language.

come into being from one?

How does two

The "things" involved may be understood either as

material.objects or abstract numerical entities and the arithmetical operation
Socrates' question is addressed to the mathemati
either-physical or conceptual.17
cians, whose arithmetical propositions imply par>adoxicallythat one becomes many

and, what is even more absurd, that the explanation of this anomaly is an operation
It is essential to see
(physical or conceptual) such as addition or> division.
that regardless of.how.the ope:bation is construed, the logical problem remains and,

further> that Socrates takes that problem to be one of coming to be and. perishing.
-Tne account-of philoso hical problems left unsolved by his predecessors concludes

p

with Socrates' unequivcicai deni�l that he can understand by their methods how one
comes into being, anq in general "why anything else comes to be, ceases to be, or
is"

(97b5-7). 18

·

·

I think it is evident that the tangles which lie at the heart of all these
··.puzzles ·are conceptual in nature and so are not essentially tied to either physical
But;,Pis is obscured by the diverse areas of
or: mathematical speculation: as such.

in which the difficulties crop up and further masked by the language of
It is also clear that Socrates' intent is not to deny
to be".
"being"and "comin
such obvious facts as that when animals ingest food they grow, that one man is a

inquiry

g

head taller than another, or that when we add one to one the result is two.

·Chief concern is not with �hese facts as

such,

with the intelligibility of statements alleging to explain them.

asks

for

His

but with their possibility, that is,
When Socrates

the ''causes of each thing, the reason why· each thing comes into being,

perishes, and is", he is asking a question that is not, indeed cann ot be, met
by statements such as, "a man grows by the intake of food", "one becomes two by
addition (or division)", 11this man is taller than th at by a head".

The puzzles

becoming of a certain "oppositen character.

question is not

in:question a re intended to challenge the possibility of something's being or

-to ask why or how something is

The force of Socrates.'

(becomes) F but to ask how it is possible for that

thing to be (become) F, where being F seems to necessitate being not-Fas well.19
My suggestion has been thqt the logical snarls embedded in these puzzles can be

defined

terized.

by

a failure to distinguish adequately between character and thing charac•

If so, the problem of understanding how a thing can be or become

something "opposite" is surely, at its roots, a problem of coming to understand
Propositions· attributing
what it is to predicate a character of an individual.
characteristics to things have not yet been sorted out as a special group different
in function from those that identify the t hing mentioned in the predicate with that

designated by the subject term.

It will be no small part of the merit of Plato's

attempt to solve these problems tha t it seeks to carve out just such a distinction.
·

2.

The Hypothe�is of Forms

:
Socrates puts, forth the doctrine of Forms straightw�y as a solution .. to his

philosophical difficultie9.

He will

rever t,

he says, to·the well-known notion of

·his that 11there exists a Beautiful itself, just by itself·
a. Good, a Large,

and all the rest''

(aOTo Ka0' cnh• ) , and
ile will

(lOObS-6) and, on that hypothesis,

also

maintain that the reason why an object is beautiful, for example, is because it
partakes of that Be auty . 2 0

As for all the "learned" explanations of these things,

.he cannot understand them and will therefore cling "simply, artlessly, and perhaps
even foolishly11 to his own "safeli explanation that the only thing that makes an
object beautiful is the "presence"

( mxpouofo.) or

"c ommu n i on n

whatever that relationship turns out to be, of Beauty

itself

(Ko\ vwv\a),
(lOOd-e).

or

It is clear that Socrates intends this novel explanation uniformly to provide
a solution to the three sets of puzzles outlined, all alike problems of being,
It is by
He runs through the examples again briefly.
becoming, and perishing.
(because

of)

Largeness that things are large,

for no other reason.

by

Smallness that they are small and

Similarly ten is more than eight in virtue of Plurality and

Stough 7

not because of two.
The s ame kind of account m us t be given if we are to under stand
why something becomes large or sma l l , more or less nu merous , and the lik�.(l0lc2-4).
Two col'J)es i nto being by part icipating in Duality and one by part icipating in Unity,
addition and division playing no rolein the relevant explanations.
Socrates presents
his hypo the s is of Forms to account for these facts and thus to establish the
legitimacy of characterizing individuals by the use of opp osite n ames (l02al0-b2).
I have argue d that the question "Why (in virtue of what) is x p1121 must be
unde rs too d to ask "How is it' possible for x to be F", where being F suggests the
If we treat Socrates' hypothesis
unfortunate predicament of being not-F as well.
as·an answer to this last que s t ion , then the form\,l la "xis Fin virtue of(because
of) Form 0° will read "0 mak es it possible for x to be an F11.22 Arid for.that to

·

:
·

'
be an adequate solu ti on to his troubles concerning "causation'·', it wi ll have to
have the effect of ¢iefusing the pontradictions seemingly embedded in th.e very

On the asswnption t hat this
co ncep ts of "being" , "becoming"� and "perishing".
i
s
i
d agnos i
s correct as far as it goes, the introduction of another class of
enti t i es over and above individuals such as Socrat es and Simmias, sticks and stones,
.
an� other . similar phenomena, together with the claim that an i nd iv
idu a l is of a
certain character in virtue of be i n g related to one of those· entities, regardless

of how tha.t relati o n is construed (lOOdS-6), would suggest very strong ly that Plato
. is recommending a dif f eren t ' and presumably improved' way of understanding .
pred i cat ive assertions of the form "xis F", where "x" s tan ds for an individual
and "F" a character. 23 . If 1'x p artaks
e
of (a" expands the meaning of the origin al
assertion, Plato has indeed cor�e up with a me ans of resolvn
i g the contr>adictions
generated by the . conj unct io n of opposites.
.
•.
The text at l02b3-d2 bears out t hc:lt i n feren ce .
Socrates observes (b8-l0)
.that "the fact of Simma
i
s exceeding Socrates is not in tr\lth as the words2i.
express it".
And he goes on to say that " S immias surpasse� Socrates not by nat\We,
not by reason of the fact that he is S immi as (T� Eiµµt'av dvcn), b.ut b e caus e of the
largeness that he happens to have T-rq1 )Je:yE:ee:i. '6 Tuyxave:i. �xwv).
Nor does. he
surpass Socr•ates because S o cr ates is S o crat es , but because So crat es possesses
smallness in relation to the larg�ness of Simmias".
·1 take the poirit of those remarks to be that assertions such as "Simmias is
larger than Socrates" are misleading, insofar as they imply a wrong acc oun t of the
facts.
The implication seems to be that what we.are trying to.explain is actually
misdescribed by "Simmias is large(r) • • • " , which, as a consequence of that misdescrip·
tion, wrongly suggests that the reason why Simmias surpasses Socrates is because
he is Simmias··-because of the b e ing of Simmias himself--whereas in truth the reason
is supplied by a quite different entity, Largen e ss , to which he stands in a particular
·relation. I have argued that the picture of a concre te individual as a complex
blend of n.thing"-components na,med b y its substantial andadjectival pre<Hcates
forms a backdrop for the probl ems Socrates is grappling with in this passage.
is a partial identity· statement
II
In�, ke�ping with that model , "�immias' is large(r)
en ta iled by the complete "description" that identifies Simmias with a conjunction
Because the form of the proposition "Simmias is large(r) • •• "
of ''thing"-components.
can be viewed as r>epresentative· of that ontological structure, we are now in
a position.to appreciate th e import of Socrates' remarks.
"Sitnmias islarge(r) ••• "
misdescribes the fact in qu estion by misrepresenting its structure
As a ,result
it suggests misleadingly, in accordance with the picture embodying that misrepresen
tation , that the fact of Simmias surpassing Socrat e s <To Tov E1µiifov 6ne:pfxe:w
&KpaToos� is to be explained by the being of .Simmias {Tl.ii Eiµµfo\> dvcu), by the
. self-evident tautology. that Simmias is identical with himself.
But of course the
So· if the confus:ions
same an alysis applies to "Simmias is sma ller than Ph aedo " .
that generate this mistake are not cleared up, we are ·left with the logica:).
embarrassment that contradictory consequences will follow from a single identity
statement:
oppos i te s will be produced by a single "cause".
It is hardly surprising,
then, that Socrates should have balked at the eari
l er "explanation" that one man
is lat>ger and another smaller "by a bead" (lOla), as well as the notion that there
can be opposite "caus es " for the generation of two.
The first presupposes
·

•

•

•

•

.

L

Stough 8
contradictory implications in a single explanation, while the second commits us
to identical consequences deduced from contradictory explanations.
The new formula "x partakes of (2111 provides a solution to these puzzles, because
it goes right to the heart of the trouble.
By separating the subject of discourse
from its attributes and affirming a relation between them, it discloses the actual
structure of the sort of fact misrepresented by locutions of t he form "x is F".
If Simmias is distinct from largeness and .also from smallness, we are not forced to

conclud e that "the being of Simmias" is an explanation with contradictory impli
cations or that largeness and smallness are one and the same.25
The separation
of Simmias from his attributes makes it possible for Simmias to "be" both large
and small.26
·

Notice that Socrates. apologizes for the pedantic tone of his new way of talking
(cn;yypacp1Kws kpe:t\r) but insists on its. necessity if we are to understand how we can

speak intelligibly of Simmias as both "large" and "small" (102cl0-ll).
Indeed, the
peculiar awkwardness of the language is an indication that Socrates' original
proplems in trying to explain the being, becoming, and perishing of things arose

out of a failure to distinguish between individual and character in such a way as
to allow him knowingly to predicate (knowingly not to identify) the one of the other.
The new language of Forms and "participation" has the effect of altering the picture
A character, now distinct from
cal,led up by the subst;ance-attribute confusion.

·a concrete individual but at the same time related to it, ·can no longer be thought

of as

a component, of a blended object.

indeed, shared in by many individuals.

It is something possessed by an individual,

We thus have a unitary object described by

its relation to other things rather than one "described" by enumerating its
components.

Socrates'

"bookish" way of talking is meant to display the ontological

structure of a fact involving two discrete but related entities rather than a single
composite of miscellaneous character..:ingredients .

Immediately following (beginning at 102d5) Socrates carefully differentiates
between asserting opposites (characters) of each other and asserting opposites

of individuals.

Statements of the former type only are outlawed.

They are banned

because they are logically viCious, both those in which the Forms themselves are
said to be their opposites and those in which a character is affirmed of its opposite

"in us" (102d6-el).
But to say, f".'lr instance, that the. small man is, or becomes,
large is not the same as saying that the small (smallness) is, or becomes, large
l02e2-5), because the ontological structure that actually underlies the first of

these statements preserves .it from the genuinely contradictory implications of the
second.27
Plato's new formula assures that Socrates can be both small and large by

·illuminating the structure of the fact described, namely, the individual Socrates

standing in a certain relation to entities distinct from himself, hence, "receiving"
(oe:�aµe:vos) opposite characters.28
·

3.

"Opposites in Us"

draw an explicit distinction betweien "Largeness
"largeness in us" ( -r'o tv flµtv µtyaeos), a point
Yet the contextual
that h as often been noted in the literature on the Phaedo.29
significance of the distinction between the Form and its concrete instantiation
At 102d6-7 Plato has Socrates
.
it self" (a.ut"o t"o µE:ye:eos) and the

·

My contention will be that far from adding a third
has, I think, been overlooked.
eleme.nt to an ontology already burgeoning with new entities, Plato is there simply
calling attention to the two versions of contradiction we now have to guard against
.and to. distinguish from statements that legitimately affirm opposites of something.
The novel hypothesis of Forms brings with it, as he must indeed point out, the
conceptual impossibility of affirming either member of a pair of opposite.Forms

of the other .

But, granted that the Form Largeness will not admit its opposite, he

is also careful to remin d us th at to affirm the largeness "in us" of its.opposite
is logically no less pernicious.
This is a pointed reference back to the philo
sophical aporiai, in which logical difficulties seemed to be generated by "the

. ·'···
·
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small man becomes large" and "Simmias is larger than Socrates but smaller than
Phaedo"--statements which, on reflection, made it look very much as if the small
ness "in us" becomes, and is, large and vice versa.
The implication_ is that we

cannot construe those statements in a philosophically naive manner with.out
unwittingly affirming opposi.te characters "in us" of each other.
To fall victim
to that confusion is tantamount to offering an explanation of the fact in question

which, however· seductive, is no less vicious logically than the undisguised
contradiction that openly identifies the Form Largeness with its opposite Smallness.
The contrast in question thus has a legitimate purpose in its context other than
Indeed the relevant
the ontological separation of Form and immanent character.30
And once that has been done, it is
permissable to contrast the Form as such, just by itself (€v TTl <j>uoe:t, Cl.UT� K0.6'

ontological distinction has already been made.

a.OTo)with the Form as it is shared in by (related

to)

some in d ividual, in its

manifestation as a characteristic of (say) Simmias U:v fiµ'i'v).
Given the discovery
of a crucial· difference between character and thing characterized--a logical.coup
effected by an ontological postulate_:.-the "largeness in us" is no more than an
alternative way of referring to the p henomenon of someone's being large (To TOV
l:1µµfov 01Te:p£xe:i.v l:w<:pa:rous), tlie very fact that originally stood in need of explana:..
The phrase. £v �µ1'. v should not be pressed further.
tion. 31
At 103b8, '.following
one occurrence_of the contrast between opposites "in nature" _(tv TTl <j>ijo:e:'l) and

"in us" av fiµ'lv), the opposites themselves are said to be "in" th�se other things
that come to be called after them, and that is a clear reference to (opposite)
Forms.32
To force a precise and consistent mea1iing on these terms is· to forget
that Plato's. language is not technical.
He has already acknowledged a certain

loosenes9 in his description of the relation between Forms

100d5-6, where indeed the "presence"

(1rp:pouola.)

an acceptable candidate to depict that relation.

and

particulars at

of the Form is actually cited as

Though the notion of a duplicate set of properties is quite irrelevant to the

message Plat.a. wants to convey, he does have to insist on the necessity of separ

ating a character from whatever may be characterized by it, because to do that is in
effect to separate opposites from each other.

are mixe.d (blended) together and confused.

. form"

('ITQAUe: i Us),

As they appear "in us" those opposites

Each visible particular is "multi-

appearing perhaps both beautiful and ugly, large and small,

equal and unequal ( 80b4).

Plato's point is t hat if·, in accordance with our percep

tion of them, we continue to take the opposites as "one" neglecting to sort them
out as "different" Ot°Te:pa) from the:"1:i subjects (hence from each other), we shall

be unable to untangle the difficulties to which he has made Soc.rates fall victim. 33
t een a character and its owner is the hypothesis
But the ontological distinction be w
Consequently, the statement that Simmias possesses largeness is
of Forms.

equivalent logically (and ontologically) to the apparently more ambitious claim
Both locutions,along with "the large
that Simmias partakes of the Form Largeness.
ness in Simmias", do,the. same -impo:rta11t work of_divorcing attribute from subject,
This is
of drawing out the realimplications of "Sirnmias is large(r) ••• 11•34
made clear at 10_2bl-c8, where Socrates mentions as the reason (explication) why
·
an individual (e.g., Simmias) is (sa:i.dtQ be) of a certain character (e.g.,

large), not only tha.t the individual "shares" (µe:rnXaµSaw::iv) in a Form but also that
largeness is �'.in�! (lv) Simmias and that'he ''possesses" (1txe:1v) that character.
All three expressions are .in fact signs .Qf a first major stepc toward sorting out
the ·troublesome notion ofpredication from.an undifferentiated concept of being.

Much the same sort of interpretation can be given of Plato's use ofthe terms
(O'ITe:Kxwpe:"i v) and "peY'ish" (&'IT6XAua6a.t) of the opposites "in us". His
aim in introducing these two metaphors at 102d9-e2 (followed by others carrying
similar meanings) is to set the stage for the proof of immortality by presenting what

"withdraw"

appear to be alternative ways of picturing the concept of logical incompatibility.
That the terms are not intended to be applied either exclusively or literally to
immanent opposites taken as entities in their own right is revealed by the use

'

.............____________________________.�j
-�·

...
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Plato makes of them beginning at 103d5 and again at 106a3.

When he puts the two

terms to work, it is the s ub j e c t to which one member of a pair of opposites necessarily

belongs that is said to "withdraw" or "perish" at the approach of the incompatible

character (104b7-cl).
Snow, fire, and sou�·, all of them subjects (among others
by.opposites , must either ''with draw" or
necessarily
characterized
ioned)
ment
"p'erish" in the face of heat, cold, and death respectively.
While snow and fire
(understood as substances) may c o nc eivab.ly perish at the approach of the incom-

patible character, soul, a subject essentially characterized by life--an opposite
C&eava:rov) and entailing .the i mper ishab le (&vwA.£8povF-can only

excluding deatp

withdraw in the.face of death.

It is suriely clear� at least by the end of.the

immortality argument, that Plato wants us to understand soul as an individual

naturally defined by life and thus forced to withdraw (quite liteI'ally) at the approach
··.bf death�
But prior to the beginning of that argument (from 102d5 .to 105c7) the
talk is confined neither to individuals nor to opposite characters "in us".
In particular, it is not specified whether the subject that "brings along"

(bn¢tp€1) ari

opposite is a concrete thing or a certain sort o f thing.

The subjects

in question are referred to quite indeterminately as"snow", "fire", "three", and

.

_..

.

·-

...

"two11•35 I believe
th� .one hand, he

On

that the resulta nt ambiguity is crucial to Plato's objectives

•

wants to hold open the possibility of treating these subjects

as individuals in combination with a literal (and v i s ual ) understanding of
·11withdraw11 and "perish" for the purpose of the immortality argument, where the soul
must be viewed as �n· indivi dual that survives death.

I mean that he needs the concrete

picture vividly depicted by these terms precisely because that final argument

has an important existential point.

But prior to that final argument he wants

to emphasize the logical i" �ompatibili ty be tw een characters "in us.n, a point which

need ndt have ontol-ogical overtones peculiar just to it.

So, if there is nothing

in Plato's language that commits him to an ontology in whic
, li. form copies must be

included along with Forms and

with it.

:l.nd,ividuals, it

would be a diSservice to burden him
'

Let us see whether or not this is the case.

·Throughout the passage in question Socrates is talking about individuals,

Forins,' and the mc.nifestations of these Forms "in us 11•

Under no circums·tances,
neither just by itself nor in any of its.multiple manifestations, will a Form admit

To stress that, as he does for example at 102d5-103a2, is merely
He sums up at
opposite will never
an
that
point
al
r
then
e
n
e
g
ld3c7-8:
agreed
this
on
nwe have
be opposite to itself".
But when Socrates goes on to speak of the opposite "in us"
and something else that 11brings along" that opposite, as "withdrawing" or "per
ishing" at the approach of the incompatible character, he seems to be .saying sometBing
more.
If, as I have suggested, there is intentioncil ambiguity in the text from
its opposite.

todeny logical compatibility between opposite characters.

102d5 to l05c7, the reference to certain otheI' things such as fire and snow,

bearing with them opposite characters "in us", could be to the concrete individual

substances or, with equal plausibility, to the sorts of things identifiable as fire

and snow.

Following the thread of Socrates'

him to mean the 1.atter.

argument up to 103c7-8, let us take

The additional claim then c onc er ns an incompatibility
'.' �elation holding between opposites and c ertain other characters that are not them
selves opposites.
The metaphors "withdraw" and "perish" serve only to underline
that incompati Uity.
That is, if we take snow and fire to be kinds of things
rather than substantial entities, the statement that snow must "withdraw" or

" pe:riis. h " at the app::.'oach of heat can be understood to claim no more than tlfat

either snow and heat are incompatible (snow "withdraws") or snow is not snow
We are being told that because snow and cold are logically
(snow " perishesi').

inseparab le

(�XE:l TTJV EKdvou µop¢nv ad),

to deny the incompatibility between

Socrates' exact words are (103d5-8), '1snow,,
snow and h.eat is contradictory.
being· what. it is, will never admit the ho"::, as we were saying just now, and still
be what it w �s , snow and ci.lso hot·, but on the approach of the hot it will

.

·

In brief, at this stage of the ar gum e n t Plato does not.need
withdraw .or perish".
a. literal interpr<:;tation of, "withdraw" and "perish11 to make his point, which is a
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If snow and fire are understood to be kinds of thi ngs rather than
physical substances, the two metaphors stripped of their imagery merely extend
an incompatibility claim already made at l03c7-8 to a !few set of characters.
logical one.

Nevertheless, the referential ambiguity of " snow " , "fire", and the rest remains
Once the di S cuss i on r.eturns to the q uest ion of immor· for a very g o o d reason.
·
must ]),e able to exploit that ambiguity.
tali
ty,
Socrates'
argument
.
The force of
of giving these same sub j ect term s a concrete
possibility
his argume n t rests on the
reference, so that soul, an individual existent, will be understood to withdraw
quite literally, hence to survive ,

4.

at the apporach of the oppos ite d eath . 36

Conclusion

The interpretation I have defended rests on the claim that an elementary but

cri t ically important logiml distinction provides the key to understanding the

problems that beset S ocrates in the Phaedo.

If that di sti nction seems too s implis

tic to have been missed by Plato's predecessors and contemporaries, it is enough
to recall the n umero us passages in the dialogues in whi ch Plato has S ocrates pose
the question "what is (the) F?" and rec eive in reply a "swarm11 of F-things.37
In
each case Socrates carefully explains the di fference between asking for that in

virtue of which something is F and askin g for a l ist of (type s of) things or

a ct ions which are F.

In fact that very confusion, which Plato wove into Socrates'

statement of the puzzles in the Phaedo, was in his own eyes pervasive and difficult

to p enetrate .
Originating in the unclarified and "mixed" nature of sens o ry ex
per i enc e, it was rein forced by a lingui stic structure sanction ing (predicative)
assert ions of the form "x is F" and their contradictories and finally threaten ed
to become part of the arsenal of p hi losophy itself in compliance with the neces 

sities of a Parmenidean-type logic.

In that context it is not difficult to see why

the hypothesis of separately existing c har a c ters (Forms) would be invoked to

explain (to render consistent) those puzzling factual discrepancies .

However

easily overlooked by an unreflective intelligence, such problems c o uld scar cely be

dismissed by someone who had fully appreciated the power and implications of a

rigorous di alect i c that purported to establish the c onc ept ua l impossibility of
somet hing ' s being, becoming, or ceasing- to be of certain oppos i 1e ch ar acters .

If my argument is correct, we may have good reason to believe that Plato was

s eriou sly occupied with logico-ontological problems of the sort first posed by the

Eleati cs before he wrote the Parmenides and other "critical" d ial og ues of his mature
38
period.
But the exact nature of the puzzles in the Phaedo is rendered p a rtiQularly
obscure to us by the language at Plato's disposal for dealing with p hilos o p hi cal

questions.

The language of atT1a, ysvEcris, and �eopa, and a context in which the

hypothesis of Forms is presented apparently in competition with the physical theories

of the natural philosophers suggests quite misleadingly that the "facts"

explained by the doctrine of Forms are on a par with phys ical phenomena others had

sought to understand in terms of such causes as heat, cold, air, fire, and even

mind.

But Socrates'

rejection of the physicists'

causes gives us a hint that this

may not be the case-- a hint that is borne out by the spe cific examples chosen to
39
illustrate the problem of 11causation11•
On the other hand, the language and

context also tell us that Plato's own conception of exp lanation is tied to a physical

model of causation .

By this I mean that to explain how it is possible for (say)

Simmias to be both large and small, he must posit entities to which Simmi as is

related and which, in being so relat ed

,

explain the possibility of this fact, just

as the physicists accounted for natural phenomena by the intera c ti on of physical
substances.

Plato's new entities are of cours e not physical objects, and we have

seen that they do not do the same work as physical causes, but the context of the
Phaedo blurs that di stincti on .

so sh arply etched.

It shows that for Plato those diffe r en ces were not

In coming to grips with what are essentially logical and

conceptual problems Plato doubtless had in mind and followed the ex amp le set by
the natural philo so phers .

It seems very likely, theref ore

,

that he thought of his
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Forms as causes of certain puzzling facts in a manner

initially not wholly unlike

that in which others had believed air or fire to be causes of various p h ys ical
40
phenomena.
Plato's language suggests that his own explanatory formula, though
strikingly different in function from any other, was fashioned after those of his
precursors

. r·
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NOTES
In a valuable article

1.

("Reasons

and Causes in the Phaedo", P hil.

Rev.,

LXXVIII (1969), pp. 291-325) Professor Gregory Vlastos has reminded us that
at Tlet is much broader in mearting than the word 11cause11, which is frequently

used to translate it.
He goes on to argue that by failing to distinguish
between "cause11 and "reason11 in our translation of the Greek term we are apt
to misunderstand Plato's solution to the puzzles at Phaedo 96 c-9 7b, which

. invokes the Forms as reasons (logical
contras t to ·the causes (physical a.'i...
youth.

ckf-1'<f-L1j in

delfberate and purpo�eful
endorsed. by S o crat es in his
Though it seems ·to me doubtful whether the distinction in English

:r.fo·v)\ naively

between· "reason'"' and "causen; 'important a.s

it

is· in many philosophical con

te xts, will b ear the burden in interpreting the text. that Vlastos wants i t
t o bear, I d o not wish t o appear t o �eg an y substantive questions b y t h e mere
oice of terms to translate a\'t'{o: . . In'many cases I s hall rende.r it·:QY. the
ne:utral ''explanationn, but sometimes, when the context seems to call for it

�

and nothing in my- argument hinges on the translation, by 1 i caus e 11, "causation",
or "reason".
I trust no philosophically sensitive reader wi.11 be m is l e d by
this·.
What .is ·clear is that the 'hypothesis of Forms is intend ed to· be :ex-·

,. �planatory; .what has to •.be made c:lear is the sort of explapation it

� l:'OV�des.

.
Compare Meno's puzzlement at Meno 80a-b and that o:f the slaV.e boy at.. 84a-d.
R.. ,Hackforth writes in a similar vein 'that Socrates' i1study f orced· upon . him

2.

the. recognition of deeper problems coricernirig c ausation,· �hi ch he had. never
suspected to be problems11, but Hackforth takes a different· view of the' nature

of these problems ·fr9!Il J:he one I offer in this paper.
Cf. R. Hackforth,
Plato's Phaedo (Library of Liberal Arts, 1955), p. 131; W.D'. Ross, Plato's

Theory of Ideas:

{ Oxf·ord, 1951),

I say 11consistent with

3..

the-

p.

26.

text" because the best that can be done here is

try to reconstruct the· sort of philosophical difficulty that gives rise to

to

these puzzles from the scatte!!'.'ed hints. and suggestive remarks embed.ded in
Socra.tes 1

account of them and their soluti6n.

absolute confirmation from-

; ··:

4.

the

No interpretation can· c :faim

text' but over and above consistency we. can

look for an account that :benders the largest part of the. Platonic context
philosophically comprehensible and to that eXteht plausible or even compelling.
Offhand it is difficult to see what the physiology of.growth

(96c7)

ha s to

do with the matter of relational predicates (96d8), not to speak of arithmeti
cal operations. ·such as addition and division' ('96e5).
Thus Vlastos (op. cit.,
p.

309,

n.

50), overlooking Plato's ·l'ingtiistiC. (9oriceptual) framework, is

misled into excluding Socrates' remarks about growth (96c7-d6) from the puz
He fails
zles to be solved; on the ground that they "involve no absurdity'1•

:.!':.to SE)e that Socrates I common sense b.¢1iefs about growth' which philosophy
'
fo'.rced :him to abandon (11unlea:m11)
sort of (logical)
, are; irifecte'd with the sarrie
'··
difficulties as .beset the rest of· the puzz1es
· .

;;

")

as

5.

In this passage Plato does not explicitly refer to 11large0 and "smail11
opposites U:vmnta), but .he does• so .a.t 102d..:e.

6.

The characterization is, of necessity, loose.
Roughly, it r efers to those
predicates which cannot, as a matter of l ogic, be true of a subject at the
same time and in the same respect.

Some pairs of opposite predicates (e.g.,

11large11 and "small", "hot" and 11cold11,

"beautiful" and "ugly") are contraries,

but the most important feature of these, as of "equal" and "unequal", nodd"

... .-.

:- l
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and "even", and other con tradic tories (jud ging from Plato's treatment of
them), is their apparent incompatibility; and this is best brought out in
It is worth noting that Plato's examples
s e l f - cont ra dic tory assertions.
are most often comparativ e or relationa l predicates.
To bring out the intended .

con t radiction in assertions involving opposites I sh al l use the variables F
and not-F as s horthand for any pair of incompatible ( o pposite ) predicates.

7.

It has o�en been remarked that the Presocratic philosophers had no conception
In the absence of the substance-attribute distinction
of qualities as such.
what we would designate a quality was th oug ht of con c rete ly either simply as
a member of the class of objects possessing that character or as something
resident in the objec t and responsible for its character.
See especially
R.S. B luck, Plato's Phaedo (London, 1955), pp. 175-6; also F.M. Cornford,
Prin cip ium Sapientiae (C amb ridg e, 1952), p. 162; W. K. C. G uth rie , A H i s tory of
Greek Philosophy� Vpl. l'(Cambridge, 1962), p. 79; H.F. Cherniss, Aristotle's
Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy (Ne�1 York, re pr i nted 1971), pp. 361-2.
··On�. of the objectives of th i s paper is to e xp lor e some of the philosophical
imp l i cat ion s of that impo rtan t obs er vat ion .

8.

·Acceptable in Greek but not in English. Note that the c onf us ion does not
spring, from linguistic ambiguity.
The meanirig of the Greek sentence . is clear.
The trouble 'arises from a c on fla tion of subject and -attribu.t·e�..

' ""··

.A

9.

ch ara ct e r · is typically des ignated by one member of a p air of '!opposite "
(in compa tib le) predicates' such as 11large"' "small"' "hot"' "cold"-, and the
But ·we shall see that the character variable must be e xt e nde d ·to inlike.
. elude numerical p re di ca t e s (10lc5-7, 104d5-6) ,,:which, if not themselves op
posites, "bring opposites alon g with them".
Wh a t about substance -terms, such
as 11water11, "fire'', "man", .and the like, which are also accompanied by oppo
There is no explicit treatmen t of s ub st a nt ial entities in the Phaedo,
s i tes ?
and if we are to take seriously the comme n t at Parmenides 130cl-5, Plato was
at on e time puzzled about their status.· N ever theles s , the tone of the pass age
at Phaedo 103c-105d (especially 104e7-105al) suggests that in that dialogue·
substantial entities such as fire are to be treated in a fashion p aral le l t o
that , gi ven the number three, which Socrates calls a Form (tota}
If so, they
(Plato's use of
·too will fall within· the range of the character variable .
l0£a, J..10pcjr(], and r::Toos: in the ?haedo does not seem to me p r ec ise or systematic
enough to warrant drawing technical distinctions among their meanings.
The
wo rds lo�a and µop�� are apparently used interchangeably at 104d9-10, and
the language at 10lc2-7 suggests that 1o£a is there used interchangeably with
r:: T oos.
The p o s si ble differences in nuance need no t carry any ontological
import.).·
·

·

10.

•

..

The historical origins 6f this problem should t he refore not be located simply
in: Anaxagdras' questions about nutrition , _n ot at least without the remind er
that Anaxagoras-' theories arose in response t o the philosophy of P armenides .
(DK 28 B8:
How and whence did it
11For what origin will you seek for it?
g row ?
Not 'frorhwhat is not' will I allow you to say or think".) Cf.
Ha ckf or th , op. cit., p. 131; Bluck, op. cit., p. 107, n. 2; J. Bu rnet, Plato's
Phaedo (Oxford, 1911), p. 102. ·I do not mean that the Eleatics were the
source of any of :the actual' argumen ts in the Phaedo.
My chief interest in
this paper is with the philosophical, as disting:uished from the historica l ,
genesis of the Theory of Forms.
Accordingly, all references to S ocr ates are
to the dramatic and hot' the hiStorical personage.
· ·

: . '
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11.

The dative case, as has often been remarked, is .ambiguous in this context.
It signifies. the degree of differen_ce. bet we en the heights of A and B, but it
·also is intended to have. explanatory force, as. is. shown, by -t:he .ne�t two
examp_\es ,' which are .illustrative of tpe same 'problem and empioy the 'causal
.o 'la <With the accusative. But' i:t is n ot at all· ql�ar (contra l:!ackforth,
<,op cit.� p. 131) that the philosophical puzzles connected w�th .A 1s b�ing
taller than .B are generated by a confusion between two usages of the ·.�reek
dative case. The sense in which uby a head" could possibly be though� ·to
'.; .'.
be explanatory is no doUbt obscure, but we need not convict·:�Sdcrates of
idiocy in this matter.
Perhaps he means no more than that reference to the
'' amount by which one object exceeds 2nr)ther generally puts an 'end to questions
about relative magnitudes, and that he himself used to think th�t" statements
incorporating such references constituted a sufficient account'''of the matter.
(If B is six fe�t taJ,l . and A. is ,six feet two ince
h s, it is the e�tra two
inches that make A tailer tli.an B; the extra two inches are whaf ]'ustify A's
claim to be taller) . . . At ,the,,,ti\l!e., Socrnt�s. saw no re ason to. q�estion further:
'·
�µ�_v yap . t KcNws µot ooKe:�i\i' (96d8).
•

.

·

12.

1 3.

14 .. '

Allo wing also that opposites
accompany.

b,�-

'
11riepess�ry11 chara � t�;isti.c� of whateveii they

,Not, �� ·suggested by l.!1. Crombie as. a possibility, the property of being
taller-::than-Socrates (An Examination of Plato's Doctrines, II (New York, 1963)
P• 312). -Through out th� d2scussion at l02d'.'.'"l0;3 the attributes themselves are
.
referred to wit hout qualification.
Phaedo 102.c4.:
crµ1Kp6-rma. ¥xe:1 .. 6. �wKpthns 1Tpos _-rb tr<dvou µeye:eos. 102c7: .
See also Symposiu.Jn2lla �
µ€ye:6o:? �xe:i p <I>a.'lowv .1fpcs -rnv· l:t µµl'ou crµi�po�nn:t�
wher.e the qualifications specifying the time, .relation, and respect in which
opposites are predicated of a sub::;ect are nade ye:ry explicit.
Republic 436b8
and 436e8 contain clear enough statements of the law of contradiction.
·

is:.·
::'."But1th�.: "is0 in_11simmias is t all" is not consCiously
(or
.
'
, ide ntity.
ff" as I am claimiJ1g, the distinction be-t;,ween
bute.

.

16.

had not yet bee:::i shc:.rply C'.J::'<<:N"n,
the verb 11to be11, viz., identity a-:id
,m<;>pe clearly.
The two. uses of e:'.fvm
concept of "being", a:�1d -i:his' (to put
fpre,. I think,
. 2. . shad3 r::is le a.dingly}
·

strictly) that of······
.
sUbject and .attriu. scrr.ant ic counterpart in two uses·. of
predication, cannot have be en seen any
arc merged in a :;;ingle undifferentiated
the probl
' em linguistically and there-·
is the source of the fallacy.

Cf.,, for.example, Archer-Hind.18 comment on l02a-;t.03a (The l?haedo of Plato,
·secondEdition (London and New York, 1894)� pp._104-105).

'
17�:. Cf;. Vl�stos (op . cit., pp. 311-312,; ,followedbyEvan Burge, uThe Ideas as
P'ha.2"<l011 Ph1�onesis,' 19 71, �p. 8) for the view. that the puzzle
. A itJai in the
,
�rises only if arithmetic2l op::.:rations are treJ.ted as physica l operations.
But at 10lbl0-c2: Socrates rej�cts withcut any such qualification the o:pera
tions of addition 2nd division as reasons.
See also 10lc7-8:
Tas '0€ erxtcre:ts
TO'.UTO'.S KCtl . :rr
p
ocrefoe:1s
KO'.l
TCTS
qAAO'.S
TO·
t
Cl.UTO'.S
KOµi)!
d
a.s
E:wns
&v
xa.tpe:w.
.
'
t

18.

. ;.: ·,

Ther,e follows the long section. (97c-99d) in which 'Socrates .describes'hi_s hopes
an<'.l his sl1bs-equent d�sappointment in Anaxagora� 1: ,theory o:f votls as the. cause
I cimi t consideration of the pas�i
. p_ge because" of Socrates I
.of all things.
.
·confe_�sion of failuri=. pith�r to discp'.v:..dr (e:0pe:'lv) by h ,i}riself that the a.\T ta
KO'.t &.vayKnof all thirigs is TO &.ya.eov' �'cit ofov or to'iearn '(µa.ee::lv) it from

16
others· and his disclosure (99c6-d2) of a "second voyage" (oeurnpos 1TAOO's),
viz., an alternative method of inquiring into the causes of things (trri Tttv
Tns a\T\as �nTncrtv).
This is surely a refer ence back to Simmias' remarks at
85c-d, where, in defaul t of discovering (e0pe\v) something for ourselves or
learning (µaee\v) it from another, we are advised (in the absence of divine

assistance) to adopt the best and most reliable &vep6m,ivos >.oyos and use it
as a raft to sail through life·(cf. Pamela Huby\ Ph'ronesis, IV (1959), pp. 12-

14). The >.oyos which Socrates'·is leading up to (at 99d::<LQOc) and which he
finally puts forth (at lOOc) iS the hypothesis that the .doos is ahfo of
The passage implies that. Socrates would have
·being, becoming, and perishing.

found a teleological explanation acceptable, but teleology as such is not the
Anaxagoras' theory does not explain how things are
object, of his search.
disposed for the best , but that need imply little more than that it does not
meet ·the criteria of intelligibility imposed by vous.

19.

The inseparability of opposites is brought out clearly at Rep., 479a-b.

20.

Literally ''that· Beautiful" (l,00c6).
Even though the Terms effectively separate
individualS, fro_m charaCters,:: Plato is not
ntirely ciear about··the nature of
.the substance-attribute d,�stinction, and.the Forms:theinselv!fs.alternately

�

function as chc;trad:ers· and things characteriz.ed.
Leaving to one side the
.. que$tion of self-predication, we bften find terms such as dAtKpw£s,
;, ·&cruv8eTbv, Ka8apov, &e&vaTov, ee\ov predicated of Forms. Cf, Phaedo 66a,
·

' ]'.;.
··.; �

· ..

. . . . .

·

•··· 78c-d,

79c, BOb.
It seems wisest therefore to render aho To KaAov alter
nately as 11Beauty itself11 and "the Beautiful itself", depend ing on which of
these aspects is· being stressed, the Form's being a subject-thing or its

··1

being a character.
·.:

.

Henceforth I shall express the 11why�question11 (and Plato's answer to it) in

21.

this form only, omitting the formulation in terms of 11becoming11•
should be

::Hri

·

23

.

•

nate Forms. chiefly to preserve the ambivalence of the Form as both individual
The character lfi will thus be an abbreviation for "the Form
and property.
corresponding to F11, which can meah either "F-ness11 or "t he F itself".

.

-,

kept in mind that Plato's solution is also intended to E?Xplain why
virtue of what) something becomes F.

I follow the convention (adopted by Vlastos) of using Greek l etters to desig�

22.

·

But it

F.M. Cornford (Plato and Panmenides (London, 1939), pp. 76-80) give's what
seems to me a correct analysis of statements of the form "x is F't., but he
cannot see ho w (1) "This rose partakes of Beauty11 is explanatory of ·(2) "This

Hence he complains (p. 77) that "we have only an analysis
rose is beautiful".
. 0£ a statement or of a fact' not a reason for the statement being true or a
11
But Cornford d id not grasp the nature of .
cause of the fact's existence •

·

Plato's problem clearly enough to see that the Form secures the possibility
of the fact, hence, the intelligibility of statements thought to be descrip
He therefore did not see that (2) can be true only because it is
tive of it.
expanded by ( 1).
The causal (explanatory) power of the Forms is conveyed by'
the instrumental dative, 61a with the accusative, and the verb 1TOte1v�
_

24.

T he clause ihs Tol's

pnBetcrt

>.£y£Tm

(102b9) refers back to 102b4 ((hav .Et' µfov

�

.EwKpaTous <Prys µd r;w d vat, <I>a.{owvos <5€ t>..anw) and not to 102bH Crb Tov
.E1µµ{av D'ITEpE:xe1v .EwKpclTous), which in some translations (e.g. Hackforth,

Bluck) is put in quotations.
Hence the words referred to as not properly
expressing the fact of Simmias 1 surpassing Soc rates ( ro r'ov .Et µµ!a.v
j.te {r;w
.E-wKpaTous) are 11Simmias is taller than Socrates" (.Et µµi: a'I.!· .EwKparows
.
.
,-''

..

D1Tep"�X£}\I
� :

,- � . '

.

£wad:

.

.

·

-

.

·:

.

-

.

-

"In this way, the;t>efore, Simmias is

The argument concludes with {102cl0):
sa id to be both short and ta ll".

,

�

Cf. Repub lic 523a-525a where the identica l problein,wh ch arise_s in that con
text over the length of a f i ng er
is said t9' provoke �hilosophical reflection.
Sight presents the large confused or mixed (auyKE:xuµ�vov) with th e small,
reporting t hat a finger is both large and smali arid consequeptly that the
large and sma ll are· one.
It is the work of· intel l igen ce (vonai.s). to. cleari up
thi s confusion by viewing as sep a rate and mmixed (ii::e:)<wp \ aµ{v ov ) what the
senses perceive as one.
Intelligen9e thus- affirrris 'the exi ste nc e of two dis
tinct �-things {the large and the sm all ) rather than pne.
Here the intelligible

25.

('t'O vorrr6v)-, Le�' tbe
opa't'6v), Le., sensory-

·

·

(To

Fo ms , niust be distinguished from the visible!'

-

·''

particulars'� to· resol-V'e by clar ifi c a tion foacj)'rl:ve::i.a)
.

fami li a r logical difficulties nia�ing the puvity of sensory phenomena·. -This
Phaedo
T6 c?ome to an ·Utiderstanding
of what seems to be a paradoxical sensory· p heno menon by_ p os ftirl g i n t e ll i gib le
·entities distinct ·from that phenomenon is the saiiie as bein g abie _t<!> :produce
an expJ.anation of it by the same device. The .Pfo� lem in the R¢ ptiblic p ass age,
as in the Phaedb; is to separate things (the iarge and the. small) left unsepara
te.�d(0o Ke:xwpi.aµeva) by the senses. Hence it dmnot be resolved by pointing to·
the diffe.rent times, relations, and respects in which opposing cha�acteri_z?ttions are tr ue of a subject.
There· is no evidence that Plato ever to�k
.
seriously the sophistries based on failure to in dicat e .the varyin g . tiajes,
re lations, and respects in which a subject might �e s ai d �o "suffer, be, ·oz.
do opposites" (Rep. , 4 3 7 a l 2 ; see also 4 36b -437a.; Euthydetnus 29 3c.,.d) ; and
thi s makes it all- .the more doubtful that the serious discussion at 523a-525a .
.should turn on that sort of fallacy. (Cf. G.E.L. oW�n, "A Proof in :fhe 'J?eri
.Id.eon'", reprinted. in Studies in Pla to ' s MetaphysicS., -ed. R.E. Allert·,_ -�(London9
New York, 1965) p.· 306; G. Vlastos, "Degrees of Reality in Plato11, Ne# E:ssay�
on P la to and Aristotle, ed
R. Bamb ro u gh {London., 1965), p. 15).
Adatn :dght!y
re la tes Rep. 523-52� to Phaedo 100-103 and p erc eive s that the main point of
the Repub lic passage is to draw attention to the way in which we come to dis. tinguish between Forms and the ir impure alloys in the p hy sica l world, which
is to say, the way in w hich we com e to discover that there are Forms.
(The
Republic of Plato II, ( Ca mb ri dge, 1902), notes on 52 3ff.).
The Republi c
passage should also be read with Phaedo 74b4-c5, with which it has close
,
aff ini ties; and Theaetetµs 154-15 7' whi c h sets forth Pro tag oras I II so.iutiori
.
.... to .the s am e type _of pr?ble'Jll.
is none oth er than the doctrine of the

•
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26.

: , := ; ·�

:·:·

c

Crombie {op. cit., 'pp. ·-291-292) aptiy':re·iri�rks that Plato's u se 'of"�a<ve:aeai.
:i,n c,onte�ts in which o pp o sites are attrib,uted to sensory particulars may �e
.
in�.;_cc;i.ti_ve �f 'hl.s � lu ct at:} Ce .to ass�rt. t�at: an iJ:l:di vi dual is both F and not-F.
.

,. _

-

· ·The· term r.iay

also :P9 int to 'th sensory,
of\i:gin of the· coiifus i on s co n:ne· et e d
"
r·_
:_
,
·
.
with op p osit es

�

'

·,.

·

·
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·
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·

'

· ·

:

'

·. _

--

.

.

. .

-_ ·.

•

..;. ··�: ..

The same point is made in P arme n ides �"'where the crucial 'distinction between
chara c te r and owner is stressed at 129c2-4 and ag ain at d2-5:
"If someone

tries to show that the same thing is both many and one--that is, stones and
sticks and the like--w e shall say he has demonstrated that something is both
many and one, not that the one is many nor the many one".
In that d i alo g ue
too the hypo thesi s of Forms is put forth in an effort to dislodge the contra

diction arising from failu r e to distinguish (separate) an
from the subject possessing that attribute.

{opposite)

attribute

.

,

_'.'.·:·:;.

,, ,
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28.

The same analysis applies to the "clever er" explanat i on (105c2), even tho ug h
it has a quite diffe;p,ent function in the argument.
The motivation f6ti pro
ducing it and the use to wh i c h it is put :a:re quite narrowly restricted t o
the proof o f immort ality; s o t he 11 clevi::rer11 explana tion br ing s us back to the
ma i n theme of the dialogue.
Nevertheless, if r/J makes it possible for x to be
F, any Form that entails (11brings along") 0 also makes it pos s ib le for x to
(I think it is lik ely that 7Trrp,
be F.
This is the substance of 105b5-c7.
7TUpe:Tos, and µovds in that pass a ge are intended to apply both to Forms· and
Throughout the sect ion beginning at 103cl0 up to the ·····
concrete··particulars.
pas.sage i n. question it is n ot always apparent from t he text whether P lato iS..
. tal�ing �about Forms or concrete particulars, but the ambiguity is necessary'
·for· the immortality argument.)
·

'

·

.

·

disC,ussion 'O·f. this dis tinct ion ·see Cornford (op. cit , pp..- 7Bff.);
Hackforth--(op. cit.,.pp. 143, .153-157); Ross (op: cit., pp. 30-31); B.luck··.
·······..(o"Q4 . cit._,. pp;·17-18); ·R.G Turnbull, 11Aristotle'·s Debt to the Natural.
PhiJ.osophy of t he Phaedo", Philosophical Quarterly, 8 (1958), pp 13lff ;.
�.,.JJ,,Keyt, nThe Fallacies in fhaedo 102A-107B" Phronesis, 8·{1963),. .. pp� 167ff.:.;_ .
pp. 298ff'; D... D 'Brien, "The .Last-A-t>gument-�.of.. .
... ., ... �--··· . ,Vlasto� .....'.'Reasons and Causes
For·
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. ,P,1ato,r·s Phaedo11; Classical Quarterly N.S. 17 (196-7); pp., 201-203; W.J
. Ver�nius, "Notes··on Plato 1s Phaedon, Mnemosyne ,l,l (J.,958) PP• 232-233.
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30.

······

··
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....
.
.

, ....

me�

immanent <:!haracter·

.

'

.

as .distinguished from the individual as such.
My"
i_s -Oirected only agalnst the notion-of a tripartite ontology , and,.
it, intends no implications as to the nature ( ana1ysis) of individuals' .about
which ·the' Ph ae.do seeins to me: to shed very little ··light.
It is noteworthy .
that .. ;th&;passag·e:.in Parmenides in whi.ch�,a tripartite ontology does see m tq. .
be implied (13Sc9-d5) has Parmeni.des _(not Socrate5) .as the speaker-, putting'·
fortr;L:.f:h..c.r.itici.sm of the· theory of Forms. I find no similar ontological ;i.rapll-.
In that context "Likeness itself" ·add
·cat:iori. .in Parme.nides t words at 130b3-4.

I··

�ent
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11the likeneS'S we possess n simply p.ar,aphrase the distinctipn drawn -·in_ the sen..
:ten.ce .immediately preceding between the Forms.themselves·(e:Yon ati-rct) and.the
The stress in the passage
things· that share"in. the m CLcr Tou-rwv µetf.:xovTa).
·is on the separation of Forms from particulars; accordingly Parm.enides is
inquiring about Socrates' commitment to the doctrine of eepa.:t:!a:te-ly. existing
Forms.
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.
!-for does Plato need the no·tion of an immanent form for the immortality argu•
ment at 105b5-107.
It is clear, at le ast by 10 6 b2 c9 (if not at 105 e 6 or
be fore ) that the soul is n ot a chare.cter (immanent or transcendent) but
something which is itself characterized as immortal ..
..
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'\. ,-cK:e:l,\>�\) aOTWV �\; tvoVnuv �X€U.) Tnv· t1TW\)\.J'µ:(av T� 6voµca;o'µ€\)'Ct'. '..At
l05c, regardless o f the status of Tiup, :rrupe:Tos, µovas, it .is evident that
ee:pµoTns, vocros, and 7TE:PlTT6Tns are Fo1-rms and are thought of ver y loosely as
being uin11 things., even though at that point ·socrates' in t eres t in the "safe"
·a.hi-a has given way in the . .face of a "cleverer" ahfa; Cf. also 104b9-10.
One of the prineipal interpretations of participation· ( µe:TaA.aµS&ve:i v) crit i
cized in the Parrne n i des (131"-132) is t hat Fo rms are l it e r ally 11in.'1 particulars

-��p

·

.



fof. 133c-134).
·
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33.

(�Te:pov) from equal

At 74a9-c5 equality is said to be something different
sticks, stones,

and the like--something:o
" ver and above all these things

( 1T<Xp a rn.\ha 1TaV Ta).

We are made aware of this difference by the fact that

equal sticks and stones sometimes appear unequal, whereas equality never

appears to be inequality nor the equals themselves unequal.

At Republic

524a3-4 we are told that the same thing is perceived as both hard and soft,
that (a9-10) according to sensory reports the heaVy is light and the light
hcaVy, that (c3-4) the great and the small are not separated (o0 Ke:xwptcrµt:vov)

. ''in our perception but mixed (auyKE:.)(UµeVoV)�,and that (c6-8) intelligenc e
.. must clarify this confusion
,f.egal9ding them as se arate rather than mixed;

by

p

that is,

(blO-cl) it must consider' the opposites, separated, as two instead
of considering them, unseparated, as one ( e: i '&.pa t\ haTE:pov, aµ<j>oi:e:pa oe:'

ouo, Tel yri:. ouo KE:XuiPtcr]..isva vorfo:e:H ot> yap av UXWP'tO'Ta YE ouo �vd'e:t' &!.).', fv).

The'·separation of oppositEis is'·accomplished by;.distinguishing between the
intelligible Form>(to vonTov) and�the visible object (ro 6paT ov ) in which it
is ma..1ifested (cl3). • The status of Forms as separated ar)d unmixed is under
lined by epithets such as EfAtKptvt.s, Ka8apov, �µt: tKTOV,

66a, 6 7b,

34.

1Bd,

Burge writes

79d, 8Gb;

(op.

cit.

in 95" and (2) !ix is

.. Sym:.:: 2llb,

,cpp.

F11

2lle.

J.lovoe:uS{s °( Phd.

6"-7) that the relation between

(l) 0x'

"must be a non-symmetrical relationship in'

ontological commitment of (l)", and (p.

10) that to affirm

(2)

·

pa;t>ticipates

view of

the

nis to make a

state:nent f:riee

from metaphysical presupposi tions11•
But Plato's point is quite
His aim in postulating Forms is precisely to uncover the
ontological cc:nmitments that really -are being made when we utter statements
to the

contrary.

of the form "x is F1;.
35.

The language at l03e 3-5 2nd 104b7-10 suggests that the reference is to particu
lars.

But at

Forn of three

104d5-7 it is said that whatever things are occupied by the
are compelled to be three and also odd, an indication that

three,

a-nd vc.:ry likely fire, fever and unity (105c), are intended to be under
stood also 2s Forms.
See the parallel treatment of three, two and fire at
104e8-105nl.
The numerical references at 104a-c (n Tp t as , n 1T€µ�i:as, Ta ouo;
Ta LETTapa, Ta Tp(a) only add to the ambiguity of the passage, which must be
intentioaal O!l Plato's part.

be i1ead
36.

as

The entire discussion from 102d5 to l05c7 may

e.pplying to both F orms and individuals.

My argument in this section ha3 been a negative one.

It has not been my

pu:r.1pose to offer a detailed interpretation of the text from 103d to the end
of the immortality urgument,
tho.n I

could hope

to

That complicated passage raises more questions

deal uith in this paper.

Instead I have focused on a

single problem whicJ.1 bears directly on my thesis with the aim of showing
that nothi:'.lg in Plato's

language there commits him to a tripartite ontology.

Given these limitations

of objective, the thesis set forth in this paper will

be compatibb ·with more than one interpretation of that passage.
37.

38.

For ex2.niple,

t'.eno 7 le-72d, Euthyphro 5d-6e, Hippias Major 287d-e, Laches 190e-

192a, Theaete�l46d-e; see also Republ ic 33lc-d, Euthydemus 300e-30la.
Ross

(op. cit., p.

83) refers to Parmenides, Theaetetus,

Sophistes,

and

:Poii-t'icus as a "group of dialogues which display an interest in Eleaticism
that has hitherto been absent11•

Bluck

(op. cit. , p.

Phaedo..• is concerned with the F011ms as metaphysical
of mo:"al aspiration that are

'real',

184) writes that
1

causes'

ii the

and as objects

and hardly touches upon logic at all".

20
Burnet finds no Eleatic influence in the Ph aedo,

but sees the later dialogues

as Plato's attempt to emancipate himself from the Megarian influence
Philosophy, (London, 1960) pp. 231-235).
39.

(Greek

My conclusion in its most general form thus accord s with Paul Shorey's conten
tion that in the Phaedo Plato "is really describing a possible procedure of
logic and not a false a priori method of the investigation of nature"
Origin of the Syllogism11, Classical Philoaogy��XIX

40..

(1924), p.

(11The

8).

Burge (op. cit., pp. 3-4) notices that the candidat es for q.\.r{cn in the Phaedo
are frequently. entities rather than propositions, .but he attributes this to
';syntactical behavior" of the Greek term a\-r{a .

an aspect of the

.'\

·.

